

# In the Year of the Pig, 1968 - Transcript and Annotations

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Vũ Quốc Lộc (<https://archive.is/YUGPb>), [vuquocloc@yahoo.com](mailto:vuquocloc@yahoo.com),  
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**NOTE-1:** The present document is to support the biography that I am writing titled *Nguyen Ngoc Bich: Anticolonialist, scholar-soldier*, based on sources and images collected in [Nguyen Ngoc Bich \(1911-1966\): A Biography, Internet Archive](#). A portion of this biography is available at

★★★ [Vu-Quoc, L., Nguyen Ngoc Bich - Citizendium](#) ★★★

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**NOTE-2:** This document is work in progress having many planned updates with the dates shown above.

[In the Year of the Pig, 1968 - Transcript and Annotations](#)

[In the Year of the Pig - Interview 1981](#)

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## Video

[In the Year of the Pig \(1968\) - Best Vietnam Documentary](#)

## Audio

[In the Year of the Pig - film 1968.ogg](#)

## Google Colab

[In the Year of the Pig - film 1968 - Transcript.ipynb](#)

## Transcript

[In the Year of the Pig - film 1968 - Transcript.ipynb](#)

[00:00.000 --> 00:02.000] Thank you.

[00:30.000 --> 00:32.000] Thank you.

### 3:22 Hubert Humphrey, US Vice President



[Hubert Humphrey - Wikipedia](#)

[03:22.000 --> 03:29.000] I would remind you that scripture tells us that blessed are the peacemakers.

[03:30.000 --> 03:33.000] I want to underscore the word makers.

[03:41.000 --> 03:44.000] And it takes a lot of doing to make peace.

[03:45.000 --> 03:53.000] It takes a good deal of hard work, building like a mighty cathedral, stone by stone, block by block.

### 3:54 Lyndon Johnson, US President



[03:54.000 --> 04:06.000] And I sometimes wonder why we Americans enjoy punishing ourselves so much with our own criticism.

[04:09.000 --> 04:11.000] This is a pretty good land.

[04:12.000 --> 04:16.000] I'm not saying you never had it so good, but that is a fact, isn't it?

[04:23.000 --> 04:25.000] Thank you.

[04:53.000 --> 04:55.000] Thank you.

[05:23.000 --> 05:25.000] Thank you.

### 5:53 Philippe Devillers, French historian

[05:53.000 --> 06:04.000] I think the most significant aspect has been the suppression of political activity,



[06:05.000 --> 06:15.000] who force the people to go underground and to understand politics only as revolutionary struggle and not on a political struggle.

[06:15.000 --> 06:24.000] In other words, you can only have a chance to change the regime only by revolution and not by an electoral process or a democratic process.

### 6:25 Paul Mus, professor, soldier, scholar

[06:25.000 --> 06:34.000] One of the most important things concerning Ho Chi Minh is the fact that he spent so long years out of his country,

[06:34.000 --> 06:40.000] and that nevertheless he has the touch and feel of the peasantry of his country, of the village.

[06:41.000 --> 06:46.000] For village life in Vietnam is the essential of the life of the nation.

[06:47.000 --> 06:51.000] And I will just give you one anecdote to show you that connection.

[06:52.000 --> 07:01.000] When he for the first time met a press, gave a press conference in Hanoi in 1945,

[07:02.000 --> 07:09.000] when he came for the first time as a leader of his nation in front of the public,

[07:10.000 --> 07:19.000] he said to the people there, I can't tell you what you have to do, but I can show it to you.



[07:19.000 --> 07:29.000] Put his thumb on the table and said, if everywhere where you put your thumb on the sacred earth of Vietnam,

[07:30.000 --> 07:35.000] there is a plant growing, then we will succeed, if not ~~now~~ [not].

[07:36.000 --> 07:46.000] Now this is again one of the points where Ho on one hand is a Marxist economist who knows the importance of the basic production,

[07:46.000 --> 07:56.000] and on the other hand a Confucian scholar, because what you have to have in mind to understand that idea of the thumb on the earth

[07:57.000 --> 08:10.000] is a simple Chinese proverb, a thumb square of planting rice is more precious than a thumb square of gold.

### 8:11 Jean Lacouture, French historian, journalist

[08:11.000 --> 08:20.000] We are now in a very interesting place about Ho Chi Minh, because in this place, which is now a locksmith, a key maker,



[08:21.000 --> 08:32.000] was 14 years ago the place where he founded and edited the Paria, the first newspaper he edited.

[08:33.000 --> 08:39.000] And in this very place the life of Ho Chi Minh changed, in my opinion.

[08:40.000 --> 08:53.000] Where Ho Chi Minh, who came in 1917 in Paris as a peasant, an Asian peasant, became really a revolutionary and an internationalist.

[08:54.000 --> 09:04.000] He was born in a poor and little village at Kim Lien near Vinh, a now destroyed city of center Vietnam.

[09:04.000 --> 09:16.000] He was the son of a very poor man, but a man who was a mandarin, a literate man, and this man was condemned by the French because his nationalism.

[09:17.000 --> 09:28.000] And all the life of Ho Chi Minh was directed by this very injustice made to his father by the French colonizers.

[09:28.000 --> 09:32.000] In this family they were nationalists since the very beginning.

[09:33.000 --> 09:46.000] He left Vietnam, went on a boat, landed at New York, at London, at Le Havre, and after that in Paris where he became first a socialist, after that a communist.

### 9:47 Kenneth Landon, US State Dept



[09:47.000 --> 09:57.000] He went on over to the White House and it came back with the very tight round hand of Franklin Roosevelt, I want no French returned to Indochina.

[09:58.000 --> 10:12.000] F.D.R. And I remember the excitement I felt that this was probably the first clear

U.S. policy toward a Southeast Asian state.

## 10:12 Senator Thurston Morton, Rep-KY



[10:12.000 --> 10:28.000] Now the thing that I think we fail to recognize is that Ho Chi Minh, communist or whatnot, is considered by the people of Vietnam, and I'm speaking now of millions in South Vietnam, as the George Washington of his country.

[10:28.000 --> 10:43.000] He's the man that they think threw off the French, the colonialism. Just as we had our 1776, they had theirs in the 1940s.

[10:44.000 --> 10:55.000] He also led an underground movement against the Japanese who had occupied Vietnam and the whole Indochina peninsula during World War II.

[10:55.000 --> 11:20.000] And whether we like him or not, whether we like the particular economic system or social system that he might develop or not, we must remember that he is indeed considered by many, the peasants, the small people, the little people in South Vietnam and North Vietnam as the George Washington of his country.

## 11:23 Kenneth Landon



[11:23.000 --> 11:39.000] F.D.R. General Gracie was the principal British officer responsible for accepting the surrender of the Japanese in French Indochina south of the 16th parallel, and that was his mission.

[11:39.000 --> 12:07.000] But after he arrived in Saigon with his troops, he found that the French were without means of maintaining law and order, and so he, as I understand it and as I recall it, he took the weapons that he derived from the Japanese and turned them over to French military officers and men.

[12:07.000 --> 12:16.000] But if this had not been done in all probability, the French could not have recaptured their control at Saigon.

## 12:17 Paul Mus



[12:17.000 --> 12:38.000] I met Ho Chi Minh for the first time in Hanoi at the end of 45, sent there by D'Argent-Lieu [d'Argenlieu], Admiral D'Argent-Lieu [d'Argenlieu], a high commissioner sent by De [de] Gaulle in Saigon, wanted me to contact the Viet Minh leader for the first time.

[12:39.000 --> 12:52.000] I said to him, I am sent to you by the high commissioner in the name of General De [de] Gaulle to tell you that we want Vietnam to join us in the French Union.

[12:53.000 --> 13:16.000] Looked at me and he said, the French Union? What's that? Is it a circle or is it a square? That was a test, because there is a Chinese proverb, a lot of Chinese proverbs, which identify heaven and intelligence with the circle and earth and solidity with the square.

[13:16.000 --> 13:35.000] Is it an idea or is it a fact? Is it somewhere? And so I answered, and I think that it's one of the occasions where Ho Chi Minh has been just a little surprised. I said, I don't know. He said, but what are you doing here? I said, I come to ask you, because we have to build it together.

## 13:36 Charlton Ogburn, Vietnam Desk Chief, 1946



[13:36.000 --> 13:56.000] Towards the end of November of 1946, when the admiral commanding the French fleet in the Bay of Tonkin, in his words, decided to teach the Vietnamese government a hard lesson, and the fleet stood off of Hai Phong and shelled the city until between 6,000 and 10,000 were killed.

## 13:57 Paul Mus

[13:57.000 --> 14:24.000] He said, I have no army. It's not true now. I have no army in 1945. I have no finance. I have no diplomacy. I have no public instruction. I have just hatred. And I will not disarm it until you give me confidence in you.

[14:25.000 --> 14:37.000] Now this is the thing on which I would insist, because it's still alive in his memory as it mine. For every time Ho Chi Minh has trusted us, we betrayed him.



## 14:38 David Halberstam, US journalist



[14:38.000 --> 14:58.000] Here you had a country which was not really just divided at the 17th parallel. You had fought the Indochina War, and all the best and most talented Vietnamese of a generation had faced in 1946 and 1947 the alternative of the French or the Viet Minh.

[14:46](#) : French roughed up Vietnamese in the street.

[14:58.000 --> 15:09.000] The best of a generation, the kind of young men who would join up the day after Pearl Harbor in this country. Are you going to fight to kick out the French, or are you going to be a French puppet?

[15:09.000 --> 15:26.000] So the most talented people of the generation all signed up and the Viet Minh won this war, and it was an enormously popular national war. And at the end of it, they came up with a dynamic society which had won a war, which was tested, which was tough, which had brought up to the top the very best of a generation.

[15:27.000 --> 15:51.000] Well there are some similarities between the French effort in the Indochina War in Vietnam and the Americans. The Americans are just so much more powerful than the French were. They have so much more artillery, they have so much more air power, they have so many more men, they have so much more wealth than the French ever had.

[15:51.000 --> 15:58.000] So that there are not going to be any Dien Bien Phuos in the American presence there.

[16:00.000 --> 16:02.000] In Washington, the U.S. Secretary of Defense...

[16:02.000 --> 16:16.000] The equipment which we have sent to Indochina is highly technical, so we are sending technicians as a temporary training force. We are sending planes, but no pilots. We are not sending combat troops.

[16:21.000 --> 16:38.000] We have seen no reason for the abandonment of the so-called Navarre Plan. That plan, as you may recall, broadly speaking, was a two-year plan and contemplated a very substantial buildup of local forces and their training and equipment.

[16:39.000 --> 16:55.000] The French moved into Dien Bien Phuos in 1953. In January of 1953, a parachute battalion came into the area. The idea was there were two aspects of it, one to control the piece of ground and then to prevent the Viet Minh from sweeping on into Laos.

[16:57.000 --> 17:02.000] I do not expect that there is going to be a communist victory in Indochina.

[17:02.000 --> 17:19.000] By that I do not mean that there may not be local affairs where one side or the other will win victories. But in terms of a communist domination of Indochina, that I do not accept the probability.

[17:19.000 --> 17:30.000] The French generals did not believe that artillery could be brought to bear in insufficient quantity, so correspondingly they were not active in their patrolling outside of the particular perimeter.

[17:30.000 --> 17:39.000] The feature was to keep the focus on the area, not to cause the quick rush of the battle position, but to build the particular battle position.

[17:40.000 --> 17:55.000] The French miscalculated, as I think did we, in the degree of sophistication of the weaponry that was deployed on the high ground. They did not think they could get these pieces up there, but they did somehow.

[17:55.000 --> 18:15.000] The Battle of Dien Bien Phu is a significant phenomenon in military history, and from all of the standpoints that one views war, it achieved a particular political objective in the full Clausowitzian sense of the term.

[18:15.000 --> 18:31.000] It represented a tremendous logistical effort on the part of the North Vietnamese or of General Giap to move the artillery pieces, which changed the balance of this particular battle significantly.

[18:31.000 --> 18:42.000] The forces of aggression seem to be concentrating just at one point at Dien Bien Phu, where the resistance is extremely gallant against overwhelming odds.

[18:43.000 --> 19:04.000] The French began the war as a colonial war. They tried many times to change this very nature of the war, trying to change it in a civil war, a war between the right and the left in Vietnam, and after that in international war, a crusade against communism.

[19:05.000 --> 19:16.000] It was clear that the French were in deep trouble at Dien Bien Phu, and then Admiral Radford talked that if we went in with air, we could knock them out.

[19:16.000 --> 19:34.000] Senator Morton, as you know from my letter to you, we were very interested in a meeting that was called by Mr. Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford, in which you played a part, and in which eight members of the Congress of the United States were present, five senators and three representatives.

[19:34.000 --> 19:38.000] I wonder if you could give us your best recollection of who was at that meeting.

[19:38.000 --> 19:42.000] Senator Morton, sound one, take one.

[19:42.000 --> 19:52.000] There was a meeting. I forgot an exact date. This can be easily ascertained. I assume that the records have been kept.

[19:52.000 --> 20:12.000] The burden of it was Admiral Radford's feeling that we should really move in and bring active support to the French, specifically air support from carrier-based, from carriers.

[20:12.000 --> 20:22.000] Carriers were available in the nearby area. How many missions could have been mounted? I don't know. I didn't get into the military details.

[20:22.000 --> 20:32.000] And it was felt that the artillery that they had on the high ground could be destroyed by air attack.

[20:33.000 --> 20:47.000] And they failed always, because they were always seen by the Vietnamese as a foreign power trying to get back his colonial power. That is why they lost the war at the end of the war.

[20:48.000 --> 20:56.000] Dean Ben Foo has fallen. I join with you in paying tribute to the gallant defenders.

[20:56.000 --> 21:05.000] May it be given us to play a worthy part to defend the values for which they gave their lives.

[21:05.000 --> 21:15.000] The defense of Dean Ben Foo of 57 days and nights will go down in history as one of the most heroic of all time.

[21:15.000 --> 21:23.000] The defenders, composed of French and native forces, inflicted staggering losses on the enemy.

[21:23.000 --> 21:31.000] In Job's treatment, Job's writing about this, it appears that he was well ready.

[21:31.000 --> 21:42.000] In Dean Ben Foo, he was ready if he had chosen to assault and did not some eight weeks before the final movement took place.

[21:42.000 --> 21:50.000] And I would submit that the reason for this is that Job and Ho Chi Minh understood the political nature of this particular battle.

[21:50.000 --> 22:04.000] And they wanted the politics, the public opinion in France and in the rest of the



world, among the other powers, to build, to give this a great deal more importance than it had militarily.  
[22:12.000 --> 22:22.000] And I would submit that the reason for this is that Job and Ho Chi Minh understood the political nature of this particular battle.  
[22:22.000 --> 22:32.000] And I would submit that the reason for this is that Job and Ho Chi Minh understood the political nature of this particular battle.  
[22:42.000 --> 23:10.000] I think the American people will fall when they elect a Congress, all the congressmen, one third of the Senate,  
[23:10.000 --> 23:18.000] regardless of whether they're going to vote Democrat or Republican, should ask those senators and congressmen,  
[23:18.000 --> 23:33.000] say, well, Mr., if we send you to Washington, are you going to continue sending American money to nations  
[23:33.000 --> 23:43.000] which in turn shift the sinews of economic and military strength to Red China, which is running the war in Indochina,  
[23:43.000 --> 23:52.000] keeping in mind that if we lose Indochina, Mr. Jenkins, we will lose the Pacific and we'll be an island in a communist sea.  
[23:52.000 --> 23:58.000] The situation in the area as we found it was that it was subject to the so-called domino theory.  
[23:58.000 --> 24:03.000] That meant that if one nation went, then another nation would go and so on.  
[24:03.000 --> 24:06.000] We're trying to change that so it won't be the case.  
[24:06.000 --> 24:10.000] That's the whole theory of collective security.  
[24:10.000 --> 24:15.000] Agreement between the commander in chief of the French Union forces in Indochina  
[24:15.000 --> 24:22.000] and the commander in chief of the People's Army of Vietnam on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam,  
[24:22.000 --> 24:31.000] signed to Geneva, July 20, 1954, Article 14, pending the general elections,  
[24:31.000 --> 24:38.000] which will bring about the unification of Vietnam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone  
[24:38.000 --> 24:45.000] shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present agreement.  
[24:45.000 --> 24:51.000] Article 16, with effect from the date of entry into force of the present agreement,  
[24:51.000 --> 24:59.000] the introduction into Vietnam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited.  
[24:59.000 --> 25:05.000] Article 18, with effect from the date of entry into force of the present agreement,  
[25:05.000 --> 25:12.000] the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Vietnam territory.  
[25:12.000 --> 25:16.000] We support the objectives that are involved in this thing  
[25:16.000 --> 25:23.000] because it was done in the Eisenhower administration in 1954.  
[25:23.000 --> 25:30.000] We were not signers of the so-called Class B treaty or convention at Geneva, Switzerland,  
[25:30.000 --> 25:40.000] but we did make a formal and solemn pledge that we were going to safeguard the independence and the freedom of Vietnam.  
[25:41.000 --> 25:49.000] Now we can renege if we like, but what will happen to our credibility in the world if we take that course?  
[25:49.000 --> 25:54.000] Every day someone jumps up and shouts and says,  
[25:54.000 --> 26:01.000] tell us what is happening in Vietnam and why are we in Vietnam and how did you get us into Vietnam?  
[26:01.000 --> 26:05.000] I didn't get you into Vietnam.  
[26:05.000 --> 26:09.000] You've been in Vietnam ten years.  
[26:10.000 --> 26:12.000] Saigon was in a state of civil war.  
[26:12.000 --> 26:16.000] The rebel Bin Tzu Yen movement tried to incite the people to overthrow the

government.

[26:16.000 --> 26:22.000] In 36 hours non-stop fighting, 500 were killed, more than a thousand wounded.  
[26:35.000 --> 26:39.000] Vietnam Premier Diem was still in office when we received these pictures.  
[26:39.000 --> 26:42.000] Unfortunately, the West does not agree about Saigon.  
[26:42.000 --> 26:47.000] General Ely, on the spot commander for France, is instructed to oppose Diem.  
[26:47.000 --> 26:53.000] Malcolm MacDonald has flown there reportedly to do the same, whereas America stands behind Premier Diem.  
[26:53.000 --> 26:56.000] Meanwhile, Saigon suffers the agonies of civil war.  
[26:56.000 --> 26:59.000] In Cannes is the absentee Emperor Bao Dai.  
[26:59.000 --> 27:03.000] First reported to post, Bao Dai may stage a comeback.  
[27:03.000 --> 27:07.000] As it is, Vietnam seems ripe for communist invasion.  
[27:10.000 --> 27:16.000] Diem, I said before, was the man of the hour. Why?  
[27:16.000 --> 27:25.000] Once colonialism came to an end through the victory of the Viet Minh against the French at Dien Bien Phu  
[27:25.000 --> 27:30.000] and through the agreement in Geneva, this trend in Vietnamese history,  
[27:30.000 --> 27:35.000] which favored the communists exclusively, could be broken.  
[27:36.000 --> 27:42.000] Since colonialism, the creator of communism, so to speak, was now dead,  
[27:42.000 --> 27:49.000] there was a chance that other forces might be able to compete with Ho Chi Minh.  
[27:49.000 --> 27:55.000] However, under certain conditions, they had to be as nationalistic as Ho Chi Minh.  
[27:55.000 --> 28:00.000] They had to be free of the taint of collaboration with the French.  
[28:00.000 --> 28:05.000] There had to be the opposite of puppets of colonialism.  
[28:05.000 --> 28:09.000] Now, Diem was precisely that man.  
[28:09.000 --> 28:12.000] A lot of it was rather skillfully done in public relations, I think.  
[28:12.000 --> 28:14.000] There's no doubt about that.  
[28:14.000 --> 28:17.000] There was sort of a cult of the little fellow in the shark skin suit  
[28:17.000 --> 28:20.000] and the little mandarin who's going to stop the Reds.  
[28:20.000 --> 28:26.000] And there was a great many articles along this line, you know, sort of Nagot and Zim, Our Man and Saigon.  
[28:27.000 --> 28:33.000] You have exemplified in your corner of the world patriotism of the highest order.  
[28:33.000 --> 28:39.000] You have brought to your great task of organizing your country the greatest of courage,  
[28:39.000 --> 28:44.000] the greatest of statesmanship, qualities that have aroused our admiration  
[28:44.000 --> 28:48.000] and make us indeed glad to welcome you.  
[28:48.000 --> 28:50.000] I thank you very much.  
[28:50.000 --> 28:58.000] Part of my involvement with Vietnam was to be active in founding the so-called American Friends of Vietnam,  
[28:58.000 --> 29:06.000] a private organization dedicated to the promotion of understanding, spread of information, and support of Diem.  
[29:06.000 --> 29:14.000] I was, in fact, more or less running the organization as chairman of the executive committee.  
[29:14.000 --> 29:19.000] The American Friends of Vietnam was a lobby group set up, I think, about 1955.  
[29:19.000 --> 29:24.000] Ready to lobby for the Go Dinh Diem regime in this country.  
[29:24.000 --> 29:28.000] And I think the particularly interesting thing about it was it was so much of it  
[29:28.000 --> 29:31.000] and so many of its more distinguished names were liberal names.  
[29:31.000 --> 29:38.000] People like Max Lerner and Arthur Schlesinger, Senator John F. Kennedy, people like that.  
[29:38.000 --> 29:43.000] And this gave, of course, the Diem government a very good liberal umbrella.  
[29:43.000 --> 29:47.000] I mean, the sensitivities and the sensibilities of many liberal people  
[29:47.000 --> 29:52.000] who might otherwise have been dubious about that regime were eased off.

[29:52.000 --> 29:57.000] The Diem regime got, right from the start, I think, the benefit of the doubt.

[30:01.000 --> 30:12.000] It is on the same plane that the interests of Vietnam are identical with the interests of the people of the free world.

[30:12.000 --> 30:14.000] It is on this plane.

[30:17.000 --> 30:25.000] It is on this plane that Europe and our fight is one and the same.

[30:25.000 --> 30:30.000] We too will continue to fight communism.

[30:32.000 --> 30:37.000] It is not, as it might be really repeated here, there is no two Vietnams.

[30:37.000 --> 30:43.000] There is only one Vietnam, temporarily divided in Geneva in 1954 between a free zone

[30:44.000 --> 30:51.000] with the North Vietnam and an occupied zone, occupied by the French.

[30:51.000 --> 30:56.000] And the French had still, after Geneva, the jurisdiction over South Vietnam

[30:56.000 --> 30:59.000] because they could not hand it over to a regime which did not exist.

[30:59.000 --> 31:02.000] It is not even mentioned in the Geneva agreement.

[31:02.000 --> 31:08.000] The regime of Saigon is only a temporary one in waiting for an election.

[31:08.000 --> 31:14.000] The refusal was amply justified if only because the kind of election

[31:14.000 --> 31:22.000] envisaged by the Geneva agreement of 1954, a free election, could not have been held.

[31:22.000 --> 31:29.000] Anyone who thinks that a free election was possible in communist North Vietnam

[31:29.000 --> 31:37.000] knows little of how communists operate and could have fallen into a Moscow peeping trap.

[31:38.000 --> 31:43.000] The United States could not agree today any more than in 1956

[31:43.000 --> 31:52.000] to legitimizing communist control of all Vietnam by a device of a communist style election.

[31:52.000 --> 31:57.000] And you ought to have sat with me on the Foreign Relations Committee in 1956

[31:57.000 --> 32:03.000] when our intelligence forces brought in their reports warning that if the election

[32:03.000 --> 32:10.000] called for by the Geneva Accords for July 1956 were held, Ho Chi Minh would be elected

[32:10.000 --> 32:14.000] president in South Vietnam by at least 80% of the vote.

[32:14.000 --> 32:19.000] And our country that boasts about believing in self-determination

[32:19.000 --> 32:27.000] used its power and its prestige and its influence really to get our first puppet government under GM

[32:27.000 --> 32:32.000] not to cooperate in holding those elections. That's just a matter of historic record.

[32:32.000 --> 32:38.000] As you know, Ngo Dinh Diem and Nhu were finally killed in 1963.

[32:38.000 --> 32:46.000] Some 50,000 to 60,000, and the precise number is not readily available, but some 50,000 to 60,000

[32:46.000 --> 32:53.000] political prisoners were released from prisons in South Vietnam subsequent to this.

[32:53.000 --> 33:00.000] Elements of the rotating governments that followed the death of Diem and Nhu

[33:00.000 --> 33:07.000] have indicated that most of those people were not Viet Cong sympathizers in any way, shape or form

[33:07.000 --> 33:14.000] which would indicate that all political activity that was antithetical to Diem and Nhu

[33:14.000 --> 33:19.000] was met either with murder in the South or imprisonment.

[33:19.000 --> 33:25.000] And from 1958, we see the existence confirmed by some American experts

[33:25.000 --> 33:31.000] and some broadcasts from Hanoi of a National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam.

[33:31.000 --> 33:38.000] It was in fact a confederation of all the forces who for years were struggling against the Diem regime.

[33:38.000 --> 33:45.000] And it was not, as it has been said too much and too often, the political arm of Hanoi.

[33:45.000 --> 33:51.000] The National Front for Liberation included the former remnants of the political religious sects,  
[33:51.000 --> 33:56.000] Cao Da and Hao, the Binh Suyen too, the former Viet Minh, the Democratic Party,  
[33:56.000 --> 34:03.000] the Radical Socialist Party and various other elements who were united in the common aim  
[34:03.000 --> 34:08.000] to overthrow the regime, to create a coalition government, a democratic regime in the South  
[34:08.000 --> 34:13.000] in order to be able to discuss with the North the provision of Geneva.  
[34:13.000 --> 34:19.000] That means the end of the occupation regime in the South and peaceful reunification  
[34:19.000 --> 34:22.000] between the two parts of Vietnam.  
[34:22.000 --> 34:27.000] The front is not what you would call a puppet of Hanoi.  
[34:27.000 --> 34:33.000] The two organizations, and I do stress that they are two organizations, work very closely together.  
[34:33.000 --> 34:36.000] Many of their aims are parallel aims.  
[34:36.000 --> 34:43.000] But their ideas do not always coincide and indeed sometimes their policies are in conflict.  
[34:44.000 --> 34:47.000] A land reform was a total failure.  
[34:47.000 --> 34:53.000] There were sporadic attempts to try and deal with land, but they never had any real support from Xi Em.  
[34:53.000 --> 35:03.000] What he did was that he gave to the 1,200,000 tenants some land.  
[35:03.000 --> 35:05.000] Actually, he didn't give it to them.  
[35:05.000 --> 35:10.000] He sanctioned the fact that the Viet Minh had given it to them.  
[35:10.000 --> 35:14.000] But he made them pay for it now.  
[35:14.000 --> 35:26.000] The downhill trend of the Diem regime is best described by the increase of corruption,  
[35:26.000 --> 35:33.000] by the increase of the influence of a neo-psychopath like his brother Nhu  
[35:33.000 --> 35:42.000] and his wife, Madame Nhu, both of whom had a drive for power which I can only describe as pathological.  
[35:42.000 --> 35:53.000] I had once dinner with them and Nhu told me, you see, we could have an opposition in Vietnam if I led it.  
[35:53.000 --> 35:57.000] But since I am the only intelligent man in South Vietnam,  
[35:57.000 --> 36:05.000] all my mental capacity goes into leading my brother to rule South Vietnam.  
[36:05.000 --> 36:09.000] I have nothing left to organize an opposition.  
[36:09.000 --> 36:12.000] Now this kind of conceit is of course pathological.  
[36:12.000 --> 36:20.000] However, this man gained more and more influence over Diem, together with his wife.  
[36:21.000 --> 36:25.000] This is the kind of psychology you had in a turbulent, changing Asia.  
[36:25.000 --> 36:30.000] I mean, this old sort of Mandarin idea, you know, that I am right, I have almost this divine right to rule.  
[36:30.000 --> 36:34.000] How can you challenge what I say? Because I am incorruptible.  
[36:34.000 --> 36:37.000] Staley bought the strategic hamlet from Nhu.  
[36:37.000 --> 36:43.000] Nhu brought it out as a new little goodie, no pun intended, but came up with a strategic hamlet.  
[36:43.000 --> 36:49.000] And this amounted to the same old approach of forced relocation, the living behind bars,  
[36:49.000 --> 36:53.000] the total regimentation of the social and the fabric of the society.  
[36:53.000 --> 36:56.000] One of the more significant things about the strategic hamlet  
[36:56.000 --> 37:03.000] is that they were physically and literally demolished by the Viet Cong after Diem

and Nhu were killed.

[37:03.000 --> 37:10.000] Every stick was taken down and every piece of wire, and the enemy took this off to make use of it

[37:10.000 --> 37:13.000] and told the people, return to your ancestral homes.

[37:13.000 --> 37:18.000] And at that time they began to take control, effective control over the countryside.

[37:19.000 --> 37:26.000] Diem was corrupted on vanity and power, Nhu on his own ego.

[37:26.000 --> 37:28.000] Madame Nhu certainly on power.

[37:28.000 --> 37:31.000] She was the one who really understood what they were doing the most.

[37:31.000 --> 37:34.000] She was the most realistic one.

[37:34.000 --> 37:36.000] She had no illusions about them.

[37:36.000 --> 37:42.000] She was a smart, strong, dynamic woman, no illusions about herself.

[37:42.000 --> 37:45.000] And she tended to set policy. She knew what they wanted.

[37:45.000 --> 37:50.000] She didn't worry about what the Americans were saying, you know, be nice, do this nice popular thing.

[37:50.000 --> 37:53.000] The important thing to her was the survival of the family.

[37:53.000 --> 37:57.000] And anybody who got in the way of the survival of the family was a threat.

[37:57.000 --> 38:04.000] In this affair, I do not think that we should worry too much because we have the same fate.

[38:04.000 --> 38:11.000] Whatever happens in my country, we shall not feel it alone. You also, you will feel it.

[38:12.000 --> 38:17.000] The base of Diem was his army, which was American-supported, and American aid coming through,

[38:17.000 --> 38:24.000] and the police force, and generally an increasingly police state technique.

[38:24.000 --> 38:29.000] But there was no dissent. They controlled the legislature, which was a rubber stamp.

[38:29.000 --> 38:35.000] About the question of a rubber stamp parliament, I have repeatedly said,

[38:35.000 --> 38:40.000] but what wrong to rubber stamp the laws we approve?

[38:40.000 --> 38:48.000] A major policy paper issued by the State Department in December of 1961 stated flatly,

[38:48.000 --> 38:59.000] and I quote, the years 1956 to 1960 produced something close to an economic miracle in South Vietnam.

[38:59.000 --> 39:07.000] It is a report of progress over a few brief years equaled by few young countries, end quote.

[39:07.000 --> 39:13.000] It has been said by Confucius wonderfully well. He said, never have laws to precise,

[39:13.000 --> 39:18.000] because the precision of the law gives the possibility to get around it.

[39:18.000 --> 39:27.000] Have laws that are built by governments which are reliable, which know you, which are close to you.

[39:27.000 --> 39:33.000] And this is how, in the organization of the Vietnamese society, the village was so essential.

[39:33.000 --> 39:38.000] And I think that this has been the great mistake of Ngo Dinh Diem,

[39:38.000 --> 39:43.000] to replace the leader of the village who was the expression of the country,

[39:43.000 --> 39:50.000] the expression, as they say, of the wind and the water of the locality.

[39:50.000 --> 39:54.000] He replaced that by appointed village chiefs.

[39:54.000 --> 40:01.000] Now, when the Viet Cong assassinated village chiefs, they were not at all village chiefs,

[40:01.000 --> 40:04.000] but people who were not belonging there.

[40:04.000 --> 40:07.000] And it was a scandal to a village that were then there.

[40:07.000 --> 40:12.000] And so when the Viet Cong assassinated so many of those people,

[40:12.000 --> 40:18.000] and I am not a man who likes to hear that people have been assassinated,  
[40:18.000 --> 40:24.000] and some of them might have been very good people, the majority might have been acceptable,  
[40:24.000 --> 40:28.000] if they had been the expression of the village.  
[40:28.000 --> 40:34.000] But at the very point where the Vietnamese nation, the Vietnamese earth,  
[40:34.000 --> 40:40.000] arises and speaks to the government through the not-chiefs,  
[40:40.000 --> 40:45.000] through the representatives of the village, the elders of the village,  
[40:45.000 --> 40:50.000] at that very point where the life of the country is, Ngo Dinh Diem,  
[40:50.000 --> 41:02.000] put simply a wet blanket of functionaries just at the point where was the life of the country.  
[41:02.000 --> 41:11.000] He brought the extinguishing methods of a government which was not a government for the Vietnamese.  
[41:11.000 --> 41:18.000] One of the very significant events toward the end of the Diem regime,  
[41:18.000 --> 41:26.000] which indicated the degree of decay particularly in the morale of the army,  
[41:26.000 --> 41:29.000] was the Battle of Abt Pak.  
[41:29.000 --> 41:38.000] It indicated that militarily the Diem regime was unable to handle the insurrection,  
[41:38.000 --> 41:45.000] and it brought about the discussions in Washington which eventually led to the decision  
[41:45.000 --> 41:52.000] to put in our own troops and not only our equipment.  
[41:52.000 --> 41:57.000] I think the Vice President's journey represented a great public service.  
[41:57.000 --> 42:02.000] There are members from both parties here today to greet him.  
[42:02.000 --> 42:07.000] There were members of both parties in his group going around the world.  
[42:07.000 --> 42:13.000] This was an American effort to indicate our great concern for the cause of freedom  
[42:13.000 --> 42:19.000] in significant and important countries around the world.  
[42:19.000 --> 42:31.000] We visited in several countries where the population would add up to more than three-quarters of a billion people.  
[42:31.000 --> 42:37.000] We didn't see all of those people, but we saw a good many of them as well as their leaders.  
[42:37.000 --> 42:42.000] We never heard a hostile voice and we never shook a hostile hand.  
[42:45.000 --> 42:50.000] When Vice President Johnson, which was also part of the 1961 arrangement,  
[42:50.000 --> 42:57.000] when he came to Vietnam, he announced a series of things that the United States was going to do.  
[42:57.000 --> 43:01.000] And this is when we made a fundamental change in our policy.  
[43:01.000 --> 43:09.000] I can remember Bernard Fall in 1962 interviewing Pham Van Dong, the Prime Minister of North Vietnam,  
[43:09.000 --> 43:11.000] talking about the American aid.  
[43:11.000 --> 43:20.000] Pham Van Dong was saying, poor Ziem, poor Ziem, he is unpopular.  
[43:20.000 --> 43:24.000] And because he is unpopular, the Americans must give him aid.  
[43:24.000 --> 43:29.000] And because the Americans give him aid, he becomes less popular.  
[43:29.000 --> 43:33.000] And because he becomes less popular, the Americans must give him more aid.  
[43:33.000 --> 43:36.000] And because they give him more aid, he becomes even less popular.  
[43:36.000 --> 43:40.000] And Bernard Fall interrupted and said, that sounds like a vicious circle.  
[43:40.000 --> 43:47.000] Pham Van Dong paused and said, no, not a vicious circle, a downward spiral.  
[43:47.000 --> 43:54.000] I'm Roger Hilsman. I was Director of Intelligence and Research in the State Department under John F. Kennedy  
[43:54.000 --> 44:01.000] and then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs under Kennedy and for a while under President Johnson.  
[44:24.000 --> 44:39.000] The most dramatic was one day in Saigon when a Buddhist parade started off with a sort of a hypnotic chant.



[44:39.000 --> 44:44.000] The yellow robe priests marching along.  
[44:44.000 --> 44:53.000] And then there stepped forward a very frail old man in his 70s who turned out to be this priest, Quan Duck.  
[44:53.000 --> 44:59.000] And he assumed the lotus posture. And another priest stepped forward and poured gasoline over him.  
[44:59.000 --> 45:05.000] But I don't think anything really gives the flavor or the fever of that time,  
[45:05.000 --> 45:08.000] other than to point out that when this monk burned himself,  
[45:08.000 --> 45:13.000] Ngozi and Ziem really believed that American television networks had staged this.  
[45:13.000 --> 45:17.000] They had paid the Buddhists to stage this burning for their own benefit.  
[45:17.000 --> 45:20.000] I mean, after all, the Americans were Ziem's allies.  
[45:20.000 --> 45:23.000] And then suddenly a towering flame.  
[45:23.000 --> 45:31.000] And what was in the priests and the nuns in the audience moaned and prostrated themselves towards this burning figure.  
[45:31.000 --> 45:40.000] And he sat there unflinching in the smell of gasoline and of burning flesh in the air for 10 minutes.  
[45:40.000 --> 45:44.000] The political effects of this were enormous. It was so dramatic.  
[45:44.000 --> 45:54.000] It hit the headlines all over the world. It had enormous political consequences outside of Vietnam and inside of Vietnam.  
[45:54.000 --> 46:01.000] People thought they saw the face of Buddha in the clouds that night.  
[46:01.000 --> 46:07.000] People have spoken very much about the monks who burned themselves.  
[46:07.000 --> 46:13.000] But those monks who burned themselves burned themselves because they were incited to do it.  
[46:13.000 --> 46:20.000] The American idea, which was that sink or swim with Ngozi and Ziem, as my colleague Homer Biggert had coined the phrase,  
[46:20.000 --> 46:24.000] I think the idea of that was, well, that he had become an expendable man.  
[46:24.000 --> 46:29.000] American policy had always been that he was the only man we had.  
[46:29.000 --> 46:36.000] Johnson had called him the Winston Churchill of Southeast Asia, which is a unique tribute to Mr. Churchill.  
[46:37.000 --> 46:43.000] And so I think that with this they had changed the American policy view of them, that they were expendable.  
[46:43.000 --> 46:49.000] And what happened was, of course, the coup did take place on that day in November and they were murdered.  
[46:49.000 --> 46:56.000] And it had taken place in an atmosphere where the Americans who had in a sense created this regime,  
[46:56.000 --> 47:03.000] who had given it what little sustenance it had, whose invention Ngozi and Ziem had really always been, had withdrawn.  
[47:03.000 --> 47:06.000] Because after all, the V.C. were about to take his cities without even a fight.  
[47:06.000 --> 47:09.000] I mean, the V.C. were running rampant over the countryside.  
[47:09.000 --> 47:12.000] The Strategic Hamlet program was really finished. It didn't exist.  
[47:12.000 --> 47:19.000] And it was not so much that the Americans had aided the coup or created it,  
[47:19.000 --> 47:27.000] but as they had given all their aid to Ziem, they had moved back and they had said, no, we just support the anti-communist effort.  
[47:27.000 --> 47:32.000] It wasn't that they were on the side of the others, but they made it very clear that they would stand aside.  
[47:32.000 --> 47:36.000] And with that, they had spelled the final end of that regime.  
[48:02.000 --> 48:07.000] And with that, they had spelled the final end of that regime.  
[48:32.000 --> 48:35.000] And with that, they had spelled the final end of that regime.  
[49:02.000 --> 49:05.000] And with that, they had spelled the final end of that regime.  
[49:32.000 --> 50:01.000] Now we've gone in on the assumption, this is the myth,

[50:01.000 --> 50:06.000] that a friendly government has asked us to come in and prevent a takeover.  
[50:06.000 --> 50:08.000] Or what friendly government?  
[50:08.000 --> 50:12.000] That government has changed half a dozen times since that time.  
[50:12.000 --> 50:15.000] It changes from week to week. No one knows just what the government is.  
[50:15.000 --> 50:23.000] I am very much impressed by the military and economic and the social programs instituted by General Kahn.  
[50:23.000 --> 50:28.000] I appreciate it also, the opportunity to talk with the Chief of State, General Men.  
[50:29.000 --> 50:42.000] In other words, you cannot defeat the communists without the support of the people.  
[50:42.000 --> 50:53.000] And to have this support, you must bring justice to the people.  
[50:53.000 --> 51:00.000] In other words, equality and freedom.  
[51:00.000 --> 51:07.000] How do you achieve this now?  
[51:07.000 --> 51:27.000] Justice, banish corruption, give to the people a higher standard of living, and make them feel free.  
[51:27.000 --> 51:29.000] Would Kennedy have done what Johnson has done?  
[51:29.000 --> 51:34.000] There were two things that he very, very much wished to avoid.  
[51:34.000 --> 51:37.000] One was making this an American war.  
[51:37.000 --> 51:41.000] As he used to say, it's their war, the South Vietnamese.  
[51:41.000 --> 51:44.000] We can give them aid, we can even give them advisors.  
[51:44.000 --> 51:47.000] But they must win it or lose it.  
[51:47.000 --> 51:53.000] And I think he was fully prepared to let them lose it rather than make it an American war.  
[51:53.000 --> 51:57.000] He felt that if we put Americans in there, it would drive, with their white faces,  
[51:57.000 --> 52:01.000] it would drive nationalism into the arms of communism.  
[52:01.000 --> 52:05.000] The second thing he wished to avoid was internationalizing the war, as we called it.  
[52:05.000 --> 52:08.000] By this, we meant bombing the North or attacking the North.  
[52:08.000 --> 52:11.000] First and foremost, because it would not work.  
[52:11.000 --> 52:16.000] And here, 30 some odd months of bombing has shown that his judgment was right.  
[52:16.000 --> 52:28.000] I think that there's great danger in this country because of the fact that so much of our economy is geared in the military area.  
[52:28.000 --> 52:41.000] There is grave danger of a military-industrial alliance of a kind actually affecting policy.  
[52:41.000 --> 52:46.000] Now, Vietnam is the case in point.  
[52:46.000 --> 52:53.000] Not the only place because we're spending \$50 billion a year outside of Vietnam for military.  
[52:53.000 --> 53:00.000] And I do think that having dropped more bombs on Vietnam  
[53:00.000 --> 53:07.000] than were dropped by all the allied powers in World War II in tonnage on that small country,  
[53:07.000 --> 53:10.000] I mean, to me, it's just how silly can you get.  
[53:23.000 --> 53:43.000] Present arms!  
[53:43.000 --> 54:09.000] I think communist aggression must result in communist disaster.  
[54:09.000 --> 54:16.000] And I don't think you're going to get that at the conference table.  
[54:16.000 --> 54:19.000] And the world is watching us in Vietnam.  
[54:19.000 --> 54:26.000] The CIA will put our money where our mouth is. It's just that simple.  
[54:26.000 --> 54:34.000] And I just wish that we would decide to win the war and that we would step out and close the port of Haiphong  
[54:34.000 --> 54:37.000] and hit every military, remunerative target over there.

[54:37.000 --> 54:44.000] And I think you're a better chance to bring the communists to the conference table than if we do not hurt them.

[54:44.000 --> 54:51.000] However, American instinct makes us want to jump in with both feet and get an unpleasant job over with as soon as possible.

[54:51.000 --> 55:04.000] But traditional Oriental patience makes them willing to carry on the struggle into generation after generation if necessary.

[55:04.000 --> 55:17.000] We're fighting a war over there with the commodity most precious to us and held far more cheaply by the enemy, the lives of men.

[55:17.000 --> 55:21.000] I don't think it's necessary to have an invasion of North Vietnam.

[55:21.000 --> 55:24.000] And it would be just exactly what the enemy wants.

[55:24.000 --> 55:28.000] He'd like us to put down 100,000 men in the field and they put down 100,000.

[55:28.000 --> 55:32.000] They're willing to lose half of theirs and ours is a precious commodity.

[55:32.000 --> 55:36.000] And I wouldn't trade one dead American for 50 dead Chinaman.

[55:36.000 --> 55:40.000] We must fight the war from our strength, not the enemy's.

[55:40.000 --> 55:46.000] We must fight it at least cost to ourselves and at greatest cost to the enemy.

[55:46.000 --> 55:52.000] We must change the currency of this game from men to material.

[55:52.000 --> 55:53.000] What's that?

[55:53.000 --> 55:56.000] What is the greatest single problem we're facing in Vietnam?

[55:56.000 --> 55:58.000] Well, it's the despicable communist enemy.

[55:58.000 --> 56:00.000] No question about it.

[56:00.000 --> 56:03.000] And the sooner we smash him as we should have done in Korea.

[56:03.000 --> 56:11.000] If we'd done it in Korea in our first test of arms with communism, we wouldn't be confronted, I don't think, with the situation we have in Vietnam.

[56:11.000 --> 56:14.000] Do you have respect for the Viet Cong? Do you think they're a good soldier?

[56:14.000 --> 56:18.000] Well, there's no question about it. They're willing to die readily as all orientals are.

[56:18.000 --> 56:23.000] And their leaders will sacrifice them and we won't sacrifice ours.

[56:23.000 --> 56:33.000] The only solution I see is to use our strength, our air and naval power, in the most humane possible, matter of matter possible,

[56:33.000 --> 56:40.000] to destroy North Vietnamese capability to wage war against the free people of South Vietnam.

[56:40.000 --> 56:47.000] So I think the sooner that we hit everything we can and hurt them over there, we've got a better chance to win that war.

[56:47.000 --> 56:50.000] And that's exactly what we should do in my opinion.

[56:50.000 --> 56:58.000] So the harbor at Haiphong and the entire capacity to receive outside help, close it.

[57:06.000 --> 57:16.000] The power system that fuels every war-making facility, the transportation system, rails, rolling stock, bridges, yards, eliminate them.

[57:21.000 --> 57:30.000] Every factory and every industrial installation, beginning with the biggest and the best and never ending so long as our two bricks still stuck together.

[57:37.000 --> 57:43.000] And if necessary, the irrigation system on which food production largely depends.

[57:43.000 --> 57:51.000] We must be willing to continue our bombing until we've destroyed every work of man in North Vietnam if this is what it takes to win the war.

[57:51.000 --> 57:57.000] Then there was a little crisis there. The military thought that there was a great infiltration.

[57:57.000 --> 58:02.000] And Secretary McNamara went out and came back and said no, there wasn't a crisis at that time.

[58:02.000 --> 58:11.000] But I thought it was very significant that President Johnson then appointed a committee to prepare a list of targets in the North

[58:11.000 --> 58:14.000] in case he should decide to bomb the North.

[58:14.000 --> 58:21.000] The more I thought about this, the more I became convinced that if there were a

crisis, he would escalate the war.

[58:21.000 --> 58:27.000] This is part of the steady escalation that's taken place during the last five years.

[58:27.000 --> 58:34.000] First we sent in only advisors. Then it developed these advisors were also in combat.

[58:34.000 --> 58:39.000] Then we sent in the Marines and the first thing was said that they were there only to defend.

[58:39.000 --> 58:43.000] Then the next thing was that they would shoot back if attacked.

[58:43.000 --> 58:48.000] And now there is an admission that we're all in.

[58:48.000 --> 58:52.000] Some others are eager to enlarge the conflict.

[58:55.000 --> 59:01.000] They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do.

[59:02.000 --> 59:10.000] They ask us to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions and engulf much of Asia

[59:10.000 --> 59:14.000] and certainly threaten the peace of the entire world.

[59:14.000 --> 59:25.000] A second deliberate attack was made during darkness by an undetermined number of North Vietnamese PT boats

[59:25.000 --> 59:31.000] on the USS Maddox and the USS Sea Turner Joy

[59:31.000 --> 59:37.000] while the two destroyers were cruising in company on routine patrol duty

[59:37.000 --> 59:45.000] in the Tonkin Gulf in international waters some 65 miles from the nearest point of land.

[59:45.000 --> 59:48.000] They put out that propaganda but they got caught

[59:48.000 --> 59:57.000] because we were able to disclose within two days that if they would check upon the log of the Maddox for example

[59:57.000 --> 01:00:04.000] they would find she was only 11 to 13 miles from the bombing of those islands

[01:00:04.000 --> 01:00:09.000] and of course that's coverage and the North Vietnamese knew that it was coverage.

[01:00:09.000 --> 01:00:14.000] Do our naval vessels afford any cover for these operations?

[01:00:14.000 --> 01:00:17.000] Our naval vessels afford no cover whatsoever.

[01:00:17.000 --> 01:00:24.000] Now the sad fact is history will record that the United States was an aggressor in Tonkin Bay.

[01:00:24.000 --> 01:00:30.000] We were violating the rights of North Vietnam, had no right to proceed on the second day

[01:00:30.000 --> 01:00:39.000] to ourselves bomb North Vietnam, the areas where her torpedo boats were kept.

[01:00:39.000 --> 01:00:42.000] Well we had a duty, that wasn't self-defense.

[01:00:42.000 --> 01:00:48.000] Bombing North Vietnam was not within the right of the President to act in self-defense of the Republic.

[01:00:48.000 --> 01:00:55.000] My duties on board the sea plane tender were nuclear weapons officer.

[01:00:55.000 --> 01:01:06.000] On August 4th there was an alleged attack upon the USS Maddox and Turner Joy, two of our destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin.

[01:01:06.000 --> 01:01:12.000] The destroyer personnel indicated at first that they were under attack

[01:01:12.000 --> 01:01:18.000] and later indicated uncertainty as to whether or not they were under attack.

[01:01:18.000 --> 01:01:24.000] Large numbers of torpedoes were supposed to have been fired.

[01:01:24.000 --> 01:01:33.000] The ship was reporting itself as continuously maneuvering to avoid torpedo attack

[01:01:33.000 --> 01:01:40.000] and yet there was also indicated in these messages doubt as to whether or not they were under attack at all.

[01:01:40.000 --> 01:01:49.000] And I have a feeling therefore that this harassment attack and this attack with 20 or more torpedoes upon two of our destroyers

[01:01:49.000 --> 01:01:54.000] was designed to force us out in a way lest we precipitate a greater struggle.  
[01:01:54.000 --> 01:01:58.000] I have a feeling that they've misread America once again.  
[01:01:58.000 --> 01:02:07.000] In the course of our conversation this Chief Petty Officer told me that he was a sonar man on board the USS Maddox  
[01:02:07.000 --> 01:02:12.000] and that he had been in sonar, the sonar room during the attack.  
[01:02:12.000 --> 01:02:22.000] He told me that in his estimation there were no torpedoes fired at the ship or otherwise during that alleged attack.  
[01:02:22.000 --> 01:02:31.000] And furthermore he constantly repeated this, sent this information to the commanding officer on the bridge.  
[01:02:31.000 --> 01:02:36.000] The North Vietnamese have no submarines. What is the purpose of that movement?  
[01:02:36.000 --> 01:02:42.000] This is purely precautionary so that the fleet will be prepared for all eventualities.  
[01:02:42.000 --> 01:02:44.000] What sort of eventualities, General?  
[01:02:44.000 --> 01:02:46.000] All possible submarine attacks.  
[01:02:46.000 --> 01:02:47.000] By whom?  
[01:02:47.000 --> 01:02:49.000] By anyone.  
[01:02:49.000 --> 01:02:53.000] Well you always contended that in the first incident they were having...  
[01:02:53.000 --> 01:03:03.000] I'm contending that having the Maddox and the Joy there constituted in view of the knowledge as to what the South Vietnamese boats were up to  
[01:03:03.000 --> 01:03:06.000] an act of constructive aggression on our part.  
[01:03:06.000 --> 01:03:15.000] The Vietnamese situation as I noted on my visit back home last week and this week  
[01:03:15.000 --> 01:03:19.000] has taken on some real spirit and real interest.  
[01:03:19.000 --> 01:03:30.000] And I thought perhaps a statement by the Joint Senate House Republican leadership would be timely and quite in order at this moment.  
[01:03:30.000 --> 01:03:37.000] As a result of what we have done in South Vietnam, not only has the psychology changed there,  
[01:03:37.000 --> 01:03:49.000] but also it has had a most beneficial effect in my opinion among other free Asian countries who looked at South Vietnam as a test.  
[01:03:49.000 --> 01:03:55.000] Okay, today, today's the day. It's the big one.  
[01:03:55.000 --> 01:04:03.000] This is the one we've been waiting for. This is the one you've all been saying to yourself what this company needs is a good fight.  
[01:04:04.000 --> 01:04:08.000] By the grace of God we're going to get it.  
[01:04:08.000 --> 01:04:14.000] From there we're going to S&D, search and destroy, the thing you guys like.  
[01:04:14.000 --> 01:04:17.000] Okay.  
[01:04:17.000 --> 01:04:22.000] Some of you, I know this is going to be a shock to you, but it's a switch for old Alpha Troop.  
[01:04:22.000 --> 01:04:28.000] We're riding in. And we're not riding in on one of those dusty old APCs. We're going in first class.  
[01:04:28.000 --> 01:04:33.000] TWA, Teeny Weeny Airlines.  
[01:04:33.000 --> 01:04:50.000] Well, search and destroy is an attempt to, as the first word would indicate, to find the enemy, to search out where he would be, and then to destroy him in his habitat.  
[01:04:50.000 --> 01:04:51.000] Okay.  
[01:04:51.000 --> 01:04:57.000] West of the stream and east of the road, Roger.  
[01:05:20.000 --> 01:05:37.000] How much race do you think is actually in there?  
[01:05:37.000 --> 01:05:44.000] Oh, geez, I don't know. About 20 tons? 10 tons?  
[01:05:44.000 --> 01:05:46.000] How far back does it go?  
[01:05:46.000 --> 01:05:54.000] It's about 30 by 15. Anyways, about 12 feet deep.

[01:05:54.000 --> 01:05:57.000] How do you destroy this much rice?

[01:05:57.000 --> 01:06:00.000] Yeah, the demo man usually blows it up.

[01:06:00.000 --> 01:06:01.000] You're going to blow it up, are you?

[01:06:01.000 --> 01:06:24.000] If they can't get it out, they'll blow it up. It's unmilled rice.

[01:06:24.000 --> 01:06:26.000] Here's all the detachment consists of.

[01:06:26.000 --> 01:06:40.000] Two double-rotor Chinook helicopters. The Chinooks usually are cargo or troop carriers, but not these. They're gunships.

[01:06:40.000 --> 01:06:58.000] The prisoners that we've captured or have been captured say that this is the most feared weapon outside the B-52s. That is because the amount of ammunition we carry, the very type of weapons, and the amount of time we can stay on station.

[01:06:58.000 --> 01:07:13.000] At the present time, we have on this a 140-millimeter grenade launcher, two 20-millimeter cannon, five 50-caliber machine guns, and two rocket launcher pods consisting of 19 2.75 rockets.

[01:07:13.000 --> 01:07:24.000] We usually carry inside two additional M60 machine guns and ammunition for them. Occasionally, the crew rat holes a few things that they don't tell us about until we're airborne.

[01:07:24.000 --> 01:07:31.000] If we work at it, we can unload in about 20 to 25 minutes, but we are in danger of burning out barrels, which we frequently do.

[01:07:31.000 --> 01:07:42.000] I was amazed when I came to this outfit of how accurate the 50 calipers were. I figured they would be known more of an area spray weapon, but they can actually walk those weapons right down the trail line.

[01:07:42.000 --> 01:07:51.000] Now, the 20-millimeter is, of course, very, very accurate and has quite a range. We can start firing with this machine 4,000 meters away, which is considerable distance.

[01:07:51.000 --> 01:07:55.000] This is the one I fly as known as birth control.

[01:08:21.000 --> 01:08:32.000] You look like you enjoy your work. Why?

[01:08:32.000 --> 01:08:40.000] Well, I've been doing it for 36 months since I've been in the service, and it's the type of work I enjoy outside, moving around.

[01:08:40.000 --> 01:08:43.000] With this particular operation, the Cedar Falls, why are you enjoying this?

[01:08:44.000 --> 01:08:55.000] Well, I think we're benefited by clearing all this area. It's the first time they've got a push on like this and hadn't walked off and left it. They're completely just going out ahead and pushing on forward instead of walking off.

[01:08:55.000 --> 01:09:12.000] Where'd you find these people?

[01:09:12.000 --> 01:09:17.000] They live right in this area here in the village of Dong Lin, between here and the railroad out to the west.

[01:09:17.000 --> 01:09:19.000] Why'd you bring them in here?

[01:09:19.000 --> 01:09:24.000] We've had so much trouble when we moved through this area. There have been a lot of civilians killed as a result of this.

[01:09:24.000 --> 01:09:35.000] As we made our pass through here, we picked these people up and moved them with us into here so that we could make a careful sweep and probe each and every hut, looking for tunnels and caves, possible VC hiding places.

[01:09:35.000 --> 01:09:44.000] We found a few caves and blew them, picked up some weapons, killed a few VC. In the meantime, we're now going to sweep back through and go to the railroad and move back out to the west.

[01:09:44.000 --> 01:09:46.000] What's going to happen to the people tonight?

[01:09:46.000 --> 01:09:55.000] We're going to keep them right here. We've got some child farm and some water and we'll feed them and you'd be surprised how they can take care of themselves here with a minimum of resources.

[01:09:55.000 --> 01:10:03.000] They take care of these children here during the night. They huddle real close together and they'll keep warm.

[01:10:03.000 --> 01:10:06.000] How long are you going to hold onto these people?



[01:10:06.000 --> 01:10:17.000] Around noon tomorrow as we move back out to the west. Then these people will be released to go back to their own huts to cultivate their rice or harvest their rice and continue their normal activity.

[01:10:17.000 --> 01:10:21.000] You've got some VC suspects out of this group, haven't you?

[01:10:21.000 --> 01:10:28.000] Yes. We just hella lifted five suspects out of here back to the battalion rear CP to be further interrogated.

[01:10:28.000 --> 01:10:29.000] How did you select them?

[01:10:29.000 --> 01:10:37.000] These Chui Hoi people, Vietnamese interpreters that we have with us, they've been in this area two or three years and they know these people from talking to them.

[01:10:37.000 --> 01:10:47.000] They get some ideas. Maybe these people know a little more than they're telling us and we take them back to get a little higher echelon of interrogation down Hoi An or Denbon.

[01:10:47.000 --> 01:10:52.000] Some of these people come back to us even and we'll put them with our companies to sweep these riverbanks.

[01:10:52.000 --> 01:10:57.000] It's hard to know just who a VC is unless he's carrying a weapon or a cartridge belt or some grenades or something.

[01:10:57.000 --> 01:11:01.000] The person just walking along, you don't know if he's a VC or not, it might be in this crowd.

[01:11:01.000 --> 01:11:12.000] But then some of these people that have operated with the VC and if they defect and come over and we can use these people as scouts and they go along the riverbanks with us and they look just like anybody else.

[01:11:12.000 --> 01:11:15.000] But when they have a weapon, then they're free game.

[01:11:15.000 --> 01:11:21.000] How did this man get killed?

[01:11:21.000 --> 01:11:29.000] Well, he threw grenades at the Marines and instead of just one, he threw three and the Marines spotted him and started shooting at him and that's how he got it.

[01:11:29.000 --> 01:11:34.000] Two big holes by his eye and throat were done by .30-06 sniper rifles.

[01:11:34.000 --> 01:11:39.000] All the rest of the holes were done by this new type of rifle, the M16.

[01:11:40.000 --> 01:11:45.000] How about all these people who are standing behind me over there, do you think any of them know this man?

[01:11:45.000 --> 01:11:51.000] Yes, they do, but they wouldn't admit it because they're afraid that we're going to take them back to CP for questioning.

[01:11:51.000 --> 01:11:59.000] And we'll detain them under this RVN program where they'll teach them propaganda for three months, they'll hold them for three months.

[01:11:59.000 --> 01:12:02.000] That's why they won't admit they know this man here.

[01:12:02.000 --> 01:12:09.000] We've put over about three million of them into what I would call a concentration camp, they call it a refugee center.

[01:12:09.000 --> 01:12:12.000] It's got barbed wire around it, they can't get out of it.

[01:12:12.000 --> 01:12:17.000] We're taking these people from the graves of their ancestors, from their rice paddies.

[01:12:17.000 --> 01:12:24.000] And we say, oh well, we've pacified X million people, yeah, we've pacified some more people by putting them in these camps.

[01:12:24.000 --> 01:12:26.000] I'll grind this up in a hurry.

[01:12:26.000 --> 01:12:29.000] I know many people have said, look, we've killed innocent people.

[01:12:29.000 --> 01:12:33.000] Our bombs have killed civilians and babies and mothers.

[01:12:33.000 --> 01:12:36.000] And I suppose there is truth to that.

[01:12:36.000 --> 01:12:40.000] There have been people that have been killed.

[01:12:40.000 --> 01:12:43.000] But your government has not bombed civilians.

[01:12:43.000 --> 01:12:46.000] Your government has not bombed open cities.

[01:12:46.000 --> 01:12:55.000] Your government has sent its bombers in after targets, military targets that have been placed in an area surrounded by civilians.

[01:12:59.000 --> 01:13:10.000] The unfortunate thing is that the enemy is quite frequently located in areas that have people who are not part of the military structure in an immediate sense.

[01:13:10.000 --> 01:13:16.000] They may be sympathizers, they may be supporting through their efforts, their work and the like.

[01:13:16.000 --> 01:13:24.000] But what occurs when you engage in a search and destroy is the destruction, the needless destruction of innocent human, innocent civilians.

[01:13:24.000 --> 01:13:29.000] Now, you might say that they're all part of the entire communist apparatus.

[01:13:29.000 --> 01:13:35.000] But the feature is that if we are going to prevent this war from degenerating into a genocidal activity,

[01:13:35.000 --> 01:13:43.000] then our attempt would be to rehabilitate or to wean those folks away from the communists rather than to destroy them.

[01:13:43.000 --> 01:13:47.000] This is what search and destroy becomes in a very practical sense.

[01:13:54.000 --> 01:14:11.000] Of course, they're the subject of our constant concern because they're such a magnificent group of fighting men.

[01:14:11.000 --> 01:14:15.000] Their morale is extremely high. They always have a smile.

[01:14:15.000 --> 01:14:27.000] I was at a very kind of sobering thing last night, a memorial service for four men in the second squadron who were killed the other day, one of them being a medic.

[01:14:27.000 --> 01:14:33.000] And the place was just packed. We sang three hymns and had a nice prayer.

[01:14:33.000 --> 01:14:38.000] I turned around and looked at their faces and they were, I was just proud.

[01:14:38.000 --> 01:14:45.000] My feeling for America just soared because of the way they looked.

[01:14:45.000 --> 01:14:55.000] They looked determined and reverent at the same time, but still they're a bloody good bunch of killers.

[01:14:55.000 --> 01:15:02.000] When a captive is taken by the United States or free world forces,

[01:15:03.000 --> 01:15:13.000] he is following interrogation turned over to the Vietnamese authorities.

[01:15:13.000 --> 01:15:16.000] These prisoners are not being mistreated.

[01:15:16.000 --> 01:15:23.000] They are being handled in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.

[01:15:23.000 --> 01:15:31.000] The prisoners were executed in our outfit as a standard policy.

[01:15:31.000 --> 01:15:38.000] We were told by our CO after our first battle that from then on we weren't going to take any prisoners.

[01:15:38.000 --> 01:15:44.000] My name is John Toler. I'm a sergeant in the U.S. Army Special Forces known as the Green Berets.

[01:15:44.000 --> 01:15:54.000] I'm en route to Vietnam. However, I'm deserting the Army because I'm protesting the U.S. involvement in the Vietnamese conflict.

[01:15:54.000 --> 01:16:04.000] Today your soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardmen are better educated than before, are better informed,

[01:16:04.000 --> 01:16:18.000] have traditional American ingenuity and initiative, are better physical specimens, have higher morale, and understand what the war is all about.

[01:16:18.000 --> 01:16:26.000] As I mentioned before about changing the minds of the apathetic populace, the key is the communication.

[01:16:26.000 --> 01:16:36.000] And most of the American soldiers I know can't communicate. They don't really understand the Vietnamese way of life and its goal.

[01:16:36.000 --> 01:16:46.000] And the only way they can communicate is through money or with a gun. So after a while they develop this kind of fear.

[01:16:46.000 --> 01:16:54.000] And so a misunderstanding and a non-communication, they mistrust the Vietnamese and they kind of despise them.

[01:16:54.000 --> 01:17:02.000] Once we got to Vietnam it was an entirely different story. The officers started referring to the Vietnamese as gooks.

[01:17:02.000 --> 01:17:07.000] They even went so far as to say that the only good gook is a dead gook.

[01:17:07.000 --> 01:17:15.000] They said you can't trust them, you can't trust any of these slant-eyed bastards because none of them are no good.

[01:17:16.000 --> 01:17:34.000] Actually it looks like this beach has just about everything. Is there anything that lacks?

[01:17:34.000 --> 01:17:37.000] American girls!

[01:17:37.000 --> 01:17:39.000] Well there are girls down the other end of the beach though.

[01:17:39.000 --> 01:17:43.000] There are no limits to me. They're gooks.

[01:17:43.000 --> 01:17:46.000] You know, slant-eyed, they're no good.

[01:17:46.000 --> 01:17:49.000] Who needs girls?

[01:17:49.000 --> 01:17:51.000] Same, same slope.

[01:18:43.000 --> 01:19:11.000] I'm David Werfel.

[01:19:11.000 --> 01:19:20.000] I'm David Werfel, professor of political science at the University of Missouri and a specialist in Southeast Asian politics.

[01:19:20.000 --> 01:19:29.000] I spent about seven years in Asia teaching, researching, studying.

[01:19:29.000 --> 01:19:35.000] As a matter of fact I've written particularly about the problem of corruption and fraud in elections.

[01:19:35.000 --> 01:19:40.000] Isn't it true though that the censorship now is going to be a little more rigorous as soon as the campaign starts?

[01:19:40.000 --> 01:19:42.000] No sir, I don't think so.

[01:19:42.000 --> 01:19:51.000] But you have said, have you not, that the Vietnamese press should not criticize the candidates in the election. Why is that sir?

[01:19:51.000 --> 01:19:58.000] Well it's our formal and present policy.

[01:19:58.000 --> 01:20:11.000] I don't think it's wise to allow people to use free press to, you know, issue criticism each other.

[01:20:11.000 --> 01:20:17.000] Because it created more confusion, more division among the people.

[01:20:17.000 --> 01:20:29.000] The elections that were held in 1967 for national office, of course in the first place could be participated in only by people living in so-called secure areas,

[01:20:29.000 --> 01:20:42.000] which excluded at least a third of the population that were in areas so thoroughly under the control of the NLF that the government couldn't even pretend to regulate affairs there.

[01:20:42.000 --> 01:20:56.000] But we should call to the attention of the people that the folks that are doing the most to keep us from having a fair and free election in Vietnam today

[01:20:56.000 --> 01:21:05.000] are the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese themselves.

[01:21:05.000 --> 01:21:14.000] Now this is not to say that the campaign of the election in the South will go off without blamage.

[01:21:14.000 --> 01:21:28.000] This is only to say that an effort is being made, and a strong effort, with our very strong support and endorsement to conduct an open election

[01:21:28.000 --> 01:21:38.000] in a nation that's under fire from guerrillas and from terrorists and from aggressors and from invaders.

[01:21:38.000 --> 01:21:46.000] And so President Johnson, being true to the origin of the elections in the first place,

[01:21:46.000 --> 01:21:52.000] was very much concerned about how the American people would interpret these elections.

[01:21:52.000 --> 01:22:01.000] And he saw that it was necessary to appoint an official observer team.

[01:22:01.000 --> 01:22:06.000] But of course most of the people had never been in Asia before.

[01:22:06.000 --> 01:22:09.000] Almost none of them had ever been in Vietnam before.

[01:22:09.000 --> 01:22:13.000] Very few of them even had any contacts in Vietnam.

[01:22:13.000 --> 01:22:20.000] And so the theoretical opportunity to talk to anybody they wanted to simply could not be utilized.

[01:22:20.000 --> 01:22:35.000] And in fact, most of those who talked to anyone except embassy people

talked to those Vietnamese introduced to them by embassy people.

[01:22:35.000 --> 01:22:42.000] Voting officials, voters, everybody were on their good behavior because the American observers were there.

[01:22:42.000 --> 01:22:50.000] So for them to have expected that they would see fraud with their own eyes was simply absurd.

[01:22:50.000 --> 01:22:57.000] Furthermore, they left Vietnam within 24 hours after the polls closed.

[01:22:57.000 --> 01:23:05.000] And in that period after the polls closed, they did not speak to a single Vietnamese.

[01:23:05.000 --> 01:23:14.000] The possession of a clipped and stamped voting card, of course, was a very important protection for the Vietnamese peasant.

[01:23:14.000 --> 01:23:19.000] It was almost as important as having his registration card.

[01:23:19.000 --> 01:23:27.000] And anyone in Vietnam who does not have an official government registration or identity card is in deep trouble.

[01:23:27.000 --> 01:23:30.000] He's immediately assumed to be a Viet Cong.

[01:23:30.000 --> 01:23:35.000] He's taken into the police station for questioning or worse.

[01:23:35.000 --> 01:23:49.000] I saw even in Saigon in working class districts where on election day rather early in the afternoon the polling place ran out of vote, ran out of ballots.

[01:23:49.000 --> 01:23:55.000] And there were people already lined up wanting to vote at this polling place.

[01:23:55.000 --> 01:24:03.000] When it was announced that they'd run out of ballots, the poor washerwomen and workmen were fighting to death.

[01:24:03.000 --> 01:24:09.000] We've got to vote. We've got to vote. We've got to have our clipped voting card.

[01:24:09.000 --> 01:24:30.000] So in balance, we had a government elected with little more than a third of the vote hailed by the United States Johnson administration as being a popular and legitimate government.

[01:24:30.000 --> 01:24:42.000] Nearly two-thirds of the people voting against it and even that 35 percent, of course, being to a considerable extent a result of fraud and intimidation.

[01:25:00.000 --> 01:25:05.000] Who's singing out there listening to the music?

[01:25:05.000 --> 01:25:08.000] Who's standing in the middle of the crowd?

[01:25:08.000 --> 01:25:11.000] A few words, these words will last until the end.

[01:25:11.000 --> 01:25:13.000] This love is a song to the end.

[01:25:13.000 --> 01:25:17.000] I love you with all my heart like a river.

[01:25:17.000 --> 01:25:21.000] South, North, together, in love and affection.

[01:25:21.000 --> 01:25:25.000] Hand in hand, hand in hand, strong and strong.

[01:25:25.000 --> 01:25:31.000] The beauty of life in the last minute.

[01:25:31.000 --> 01:25:38.000] It was bad enough for the generals to get away with double voting and ballot box stuffing.

[01:25:38.000 --> 01:25:47.000] But to have the American observers say that they thought it was all fine and dandy made Vietnamese very mad indeed.

[01:25:48.000 --> 01:25:52.000] There were efforts to protest election fraud.

[01:25:52.000 --> 01:25:54.000] There were student demonstrations.

[01:25:54.000 --> 01:26:02.000] And as a matter of fact, at one point it almost looked as if the election would be invalidated.

[01:26:02.000 --> 01:26:17.000] What I think we've come to and what I think the tragedy of Vietnam clearly demonstrates is that we now find ourselves in a world in which the arrangements of power cannot yet be ignored.

[01:26:17.000 --> 01:26:22.000] But in which the instruments of power no longer work.

[01:26:22.000 --> 01:26:38.000] This, if this lesson has been taught us in Vietnam, then the stubborn little guerrillas out there who saw it off the American giant at the knees and brought him down, almost like David versus Goliath,

[01:26:38.000 --> 01:26:50.000] will have done a great service not only to their own cause, whatever one may think about it, but perhaps to the cause of world peace and perhaps most particularly to the colossus himself.

[01:26:50.000 --> 01:26:53.000] Maybe we needed to be brought up short.

[01:26:53.000 --> 01:27:03.000] Maybe what we've been doing in Vietnam all along is an exercise in what Senator Fulbright has called the arrogance of power.

[01:27:05.000 --> 01:27:14.000] We cannot retreat from any place and I can tell you that we don't intend to retreat.

[01:27:14.000 --> 01:27:23.000] We were asked by the State Department to prepare a letter and send it to Ho Chi Minh through a channel which had been opened and was available to us.

[01:27:23.000 --> 01:27:26.000] We were certain would deliver the letter directly to him.

[01:27:26.000 --> 01:27:40.000] It was a very conciliatory letter written in the State Department in consultation word by word with Secretary Bundy, Secretary Katzenbach and others in which we spoke on behalf.

[01:27:40.000 --> 01:27:45.000] This was the actual phraseology, on behalf of high officials of the State Department.

[01:27:45.000 --> 01:27:50.000] All of Asia, free Asia, as well as communist Asia, is watching Vietnam.

[01:27:50.000 --> 01:28:00.000] And if, for example, out of this present struggle, after making this great commitment, after turning around the psychology in Asia,

[01:28:00.000 --> 01:28:07.000] we then agree to a coalition government with the communists or we force the South Vietnamese into a neutralized position,

[01:28:07.000 --> 01:28:16.000] a neutralized as we did Laos, or if we make any kind of territorial concessions to the Viet Cong,

[01:28:16.000 --> 01:28:26.000] either one of these three courses of action would be interpreted as a retreat and also a defeat not only for South Vietnam but for the United States.

[01:28:26.000 --> 01:28:30.000] We had an extended interview, almost two hours, with Ho Chi Minh.

[01:28:30.000 --> 01:28:39.000] It was perfectly clear in the course of that interview that Ho Chi Minh was delivering to us certain information he expected us to deliver back to the State Department.

[01:28:39.000 --> 01:28:52.000] And on the side of Ho Chi Minh, understand that first of all he will bring to the negotiation the prestige of an unparalleled life of devotion to his country.

[01:28:52.000 --> 01:28:57.000] In the history of this century, he will be the great patriot.

[01:28:57.000 --> 01:29:02.000] And be careful here. Don't forget that he is a Marxist.

[01:29:02.000 --> 01:29:08.000] And don't expect him to turn a traitor to the ideal of his life.

[01:29:08.000 --> 01:29:16.000] He was unyielding on the point that the bombing had to halt before his negotiators would enter into any kind of substantive discussions.

[01:29:17.000 --> 01:29:23.000] But I think he was trying to make the point, making it repeatedly, that after that the agenda was open.

[01:29:23.000 --> 01:29:30.000] Now there may be those who say, well, obviously, you haven't offered them enough.

[01:29:30.000 --> 01:29:34.000] Well, it's true that we haven't offered them South Vietnam.

[01:29:34.000 --> 01:29:43.000] And it is true that we have not agreed to assure them that we will stop the bombing on a permanent and unconditional basis.

[01:29:43.000 --> 01:29:54.000] We discovered some time later, when the correspondence was made public by Hanoi, that four days before our letter could arrive in Hanoi,

[01:29:54.000 --> 01:30:01.000] a letter arrived there sent over President Johnson's signature, which was a very hard-line letter indeed,

[01:30:01.000 --> 01:30:07.000] which restated all the previous conditions regarding cessation of the bombing and even added some new ones,

[01:30:07.000 --> 01:30:16.000] and which was, in our judgment, intended to do what it did do, which was to

break off any possibility of negotiation at that time.

[01:30:16.000 --> 01:30:26.000] This letter, we subsequently learned, had been written two days before ours was written in conjunction with the State Department.

[01:30:26.000 --> 01:30:34.000] We found to our surprise and shock, I might say, that Harriman was already saying that he proposed to negotiate the settlement

[01:30:34.000 --> 01:30:41.000] by suggesting that there had to be some reciprocal military action in return for the final cessation of the bombing.

[01:30:41.000 --> 01:30:49.000] In other words, the same point that Johnson had been standing on before he made the speech of March 31st.

[01:30:49.000 --> 01:30:54.000] It was almost as though Harriman turned off his hearing aid when we told him that this would not work,

[01:30:54.000 --> 01:31:02.000] this was not the understanding the North Vietnamese had, and they would certainly repudiate it if he attempted to take that position at the bargaining table.

[01:31:02.000 --> 01:31:06.000] And this, of course, is what did happen at Paris.

[01:31:06.000 --> 01:31:22.000] In the view of the North Vietnamese, the reciprocity means United States is bombing North Vietnam, and North Vietnam must bomb United States.

[01:31:22.000 --> 01:31:29.000] This, in their view, is reciprocity. Since North Vietnam is not bombing the United States,

[01:31:30.000 --> 01:31:33.000] the United States should not bomb North Vietnam.

[01:31:33.000 --> 01:31:42.000] The general impression that I came away with, and I think here I would speak for my colleague Bill Baggs,

[01:31:42.000 --> 01:31:54.000] was that we were dealing with the State Department on a basis of what we have come to call Fulbright's law, never trust the State Department.

[01:31:54.000 --> 01:32:05.000] Bombing is going on in the South. We haven't bombed anybody's embassy in Hanoi, but they've bombed our embassy in Saigon.

[01:32:05.000 --> 01:32:09.000] Arms continue to flow, men continue to come.

[01:32:09.000 --> 01:32:17.000] We've tried all over the earth to find an answer to the question, what else would stop if the bombing stopped?

[01:32:17.000 --> 01:32:27.000] The niceties of the argument about whether there are two Vietnams or one Vietnam seem quite inconsequential when you're talking to Ho Chi Minh.

[01:32:27.000 --> 01:32:36.000] It would seem incredible that this man does not speak for most of the Vietnamese, not all, but most.

[01:32:36.000 --> 01:32:42.000] And the idea that there could be some arbitrary geographic dividing line that would cut off his influence

[01:32:42.000 --> 01:32:53.000] has been proved an absurdity by the figure and determination of the National Liberation Front that fights in his name in the South.

[01:32:53.000 --> 01:33:01.000] My name's Olivier Todd. I'm a journalist on the non-Communist, liberal, left-wing French paper Le Nouvelle Observateur.

[01:33:01.000 --> 01:33:09.000] I first went to South Vietnam when escalation started in 1965, and I first went to North Vietnam at the end of 1967.

[01:33:09.000 --> 01:33:15.000] I'm Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times, assistant managing editor of the Times.

[01:33:15.000 --> 01:33:23.000] I'm Father Daniel Berrigan. I'm working here at Cornell teaching and helping with the peace movement.

[01:33:23.000 --> 01:33:29.000] It's about one month since I was in North Vietnam on a project to get the three American fliers out.

[01:33:29.000 --> 01:33:37.000] At the time I went to North Vietnam, the communiques which were being issued by Washington in particular

[01:33:37.000 --> 01:33:44.000] about the American bombing raids on the North gave the impression,



although they did not say so specifically,

[01:33:44.000 --> 01:33:52.000] that we were not killing civilians in any substantial numbers at least in the course of our very heavy bombing offensive.

[01:33:52.000 --> 01:33:58.000] Indeed, President Johnson himself said that the targets were steel and concrete.

[01:33:58.000 --> 01:34:05.000] I think almost anyone familiar with war would have been somewhat skeptical of the ability to bomb with such precision,

[01:34:05.000 --> 01:34:12.000] and indeed when I got on the spot in North Vietnam I discovered, of course, that while the bombs presumably had been aimed

[01:34:12.000 --> 01:34:22.000] toward military objectives as best the aviators could aim them, they indeed did kill many civilians and demolished large areas of civilian housing.

[01:34:22.000 --> 01:34:29.000] Before I left for North Vietnam, I was under the impression that it was a small country that was just sort of vaguely fighting back.

[01:34:29.000 --> 01:34:38.000] But after seeing many battles against American planes from the banks of the Red River, I changed my opinions completely.

[01:34:38.000 --> 01:34:45.000] The anti-aircraft in North Vietnam, in certain packed pockets as the American pilots say, is absolutely formidable.

[01:34:45.000 --> 01:34:53.000] It's a sort of four-level affair. You have people equipped with submachine guns and rifles shooting at a first level,

[01:34:53.000 --> 01:35:01.000] forcing the planes to go up to a second level, where there they come against the machine guns, a lot of them being Chinese,

[01:35:01.000 --> 01:35:09.000] and then they're forced up to a third level, which is that of the ordinary guns, most of them I would say Russian,

[01:35:09.000 --> 01:35:19.000] and after that they go up to a level where they meet the SAMs, and I would have been told that these SAMs were antiquated.

[01:35:19.000 --> 01:35:29.000] Well, in fact they're not. They're formerly powerful. During one week in October I saw at least 11 planes in five days

[01:35:29.000 --> 01:35:37.000] being shot by the North Vietnamese anti-aircraft defense.

[01:35:42.000 --> 01:35:53.000] When you walk about the streets of Hanoi, you are struck by the fact that you constantly see civilians going about in trucks with guns in their arms,

[01:35:53.000 --> 01:36:02.000] or even walking down the streets with guns strapped to their back. It's unusual to see so many people with guns in their hands,

[01:36:02.000 --> 01:36:05.000] and it's most unusual to see this in a communist country.

[01:36:05.000 --> 01:36:15.000] One evening on the road to Haiphong, we were bombed 300 yards from where we were, and with my interpreter we immediately went onto the side road.

[01:36:15.000 --> 01:36:22.000] I was very frightened. I was terribly frightened. But as soon as we bumped into a machine gun nest, fear disappeared,

[01:36:22.000 --> 01:36:29.000] and the government has understood this, and I think this is one of the reasons why it has armed most of the population.

[01:36:29.000 --> 01:36:38.000] We went into the countryside, and we saw great evidence in the cities as well that the people are generally armed.

[01:36:39.000 --> 01:36:48.000] The civilian militia is very large. The women share, for instance, the burden of anti-aircraft gunfire, defense of the city.

[01:36:48.000 --> 01:36:57.000] We saw large numbers of men and women on the roofs of buildings preparing in the early stages of air alarms for the bombardment itself,

[01:36:57.000 --> 01:37:06.000] and they said to us quite openly on several occasions, look, one of the most practical evidences of the truth that this government speaks for us

[01:37:06.000 --> 01:37:14.000] is that the government has armed us to the point where, if we wanted, we could bring the government down in a day, and they themselves know this.

[01:37:16.000 --> 01:37:23.000] At the time that I was in North Vietnam, there obviously had not been any breaking of the morale of the people,  
[01:37:23.000 --> 01:37:30.000] either in the cities or, as far as I could observe, out in the villages, although they had been subjected to an extremely heavy bombardment.  
[01:37:30.000 --> 01:37:37.000] At that time, it was reaching the levels of World War II, and of course, since that time, it has been much, much strengthened.  
[01:37:37.000 --> 01:37:45.000] The people of North Vietnam are young, for the most part, and the war effort is largely on the backs of teenagers,  
[01:37:45.000 --> 01:37:49.000] not because they're running out of manpower, but because this is a young country.  
[01:37:49.000 --> 01:37:57.000] There is nothing that has not been attacked. There is no threat that has not been tried to be burned or frayed or broken by us,  
[01:37:57.000 --> 01:38:01.000] and yet none of it has happened or it's been repaired in the night.  
[01:38:01.000 --> 01:38:08.000] Altogether, I think one can say, objectively, that there isn't a town left standing apart from Haiphong and Hanoi.  
[01:38:08.000 --> 01:38:21.000] So that there are hospitals, there are schools, there is a trusted government, and there are political leaders whom they don't hesitate to call loved and admired.  
[01:38:22.000 --> 01:38:31.000] Which is to say the war is not working. It's a very simple judgment, too simple for the complexities of our power,  
[01:38:31.000 --> 01:38:42.000] perhaps in a deeper spiritual sense too, too tough to face because it means the end of the giant, it means the last days of Superman.  
[01:38:42.000 --> 01:38:50.000] It means that for those with the capacity of overkill, kill is not enough.  
[01:38:53.000 --> 01:39:00.000] The real thing required is to live in the real world, as Buper says, it is to be able to imagine the real world and imagine human beings,  
[01:39:00.000 --> 01:39:08.000] and as long as the dinosaur couldn't do it, he ended up on the museum shelf, and as long as Superman can't do it, he can raven and destroy,  
[01:39:08.000 --> 01:39:15.000] but he cannot give life, and he cannot even truly, as we know so bitterly, he cannot live himself.  
[01:39:16.000 --> 01:39:25.000] The North Vietnamese always insist that they are winning this war, that they are not simply resisting.  
[01:39:25.000 --> 01:39:34.000] And when I talked to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, he said, we are not under bombing, we are facing the bombs.  
[01:39:34.000 --> 01:39:45.000] And at first I thought that this was mere propaganda, but seeing the North Vietnamese fighting in the country and in the towns, I think that psychologically it is true.  
[01:39:45.000 --> 01:39:55.000] I was most interested to find that when I got to Hanoi, the authorities put no restrictions on what I wanted to send out.  
[01:39:56.000 --> 01:40:07.000] Prime Minister Pham Van Dong stressed in his talk with me the parallel between the ancient struggles of the Vietnamese people against the Chinese, the Manchus, and the Mongols,  
[01:40:07.000 --> 01:40:13.000] and their contemporary struggles for independence, which began, of course, under the French.  
[01:40:13.000 --> 01:40:22.000] Many years ago were continued without interruption through World War II, then resumed again against the French, and are now being carried on against the Americans.  
[01:40:22.000 --> 01:40:31.000] Prime Minister Pham Van Dong turned to me at one point and said, Mr. Salisbury, how long do you want to fight? Would you like to fight for 10 years, 20, or 30?  
[01:40:31.000 --> 01:40:34.000] You pick the term of yours, we are ready to accommodate you.  
[01:40:34.000 --> 01:40:43.000] A rather bold statement, and maybe it had some bravado in it, but this is, again, in accordance with the spirit of the Vietnamese people.  
[01:40:43.000 --> 01:40:52.000] There's no one in that society who doesn't remember hunger in his own lifetime, and it was interesting that from the peasants to the young intellectuals,

[01:40:52.000 --> 01:41:00.000] when you pose the very same question, that is to say, what has the revolution meant, first of all, to you, you'll get the same answer.

[01:41:00.000 --> 01:41:03.000] We now have enough to eat, as simple as that.

[01:41:03.000 --> 01:41:09.000] So that when the North Vietnamese government makes it, it's a pledge of honor that the rice bowl will be filled.

[01:41:10.000 --> 01:41:16.000] This is so great a thing that we can hardly conceive of it. It just seems to be off our radar.

[01:41:16.000 --> 01:41:22.000] I think, you know, for them, the question is, first of all, a very, very concrete one. That statement is literally true.

[01:41:22.000 --> 01:41:33.000] And then again, it begins to move into the larger areas. The circumference of the bowl expands, and you note that the revolution has meant a passion for education,

[01:41:34.000 --> 01:41:40.000] a passion for grassroots involvement in their own future, their own social structures, their own politics,

[01:41:40.000 --> 01:41:48.000] and that at the other end of that power, which they are trying to move upward after so many, many years of colonial powerlessness,

[01:41:48.000 --> 01:41:56.000] at the other end of that power is standing a man who also has a rice bowl in his hand and whose poverty is equivalent,

[01:41:56.000 --> 01:42:06.000] whose power has not separated himself from the fate of the majority, who can move in the same cheap cotton clothing and with dignity among them,

[01:42:06.000 --> 01:42:18.000] and whose power is not an inferior backroom game or a game of marked cards under a table or a corrupt double-talk such as we've gotten so used to in the Chanceries of the West.

[01:42:18.000 --> 01:42:27.000] Yet there is one light of hope, and this is that throughout Vietnamese history, they had catastrophes.

[01:42:27.000 --> 01:42:34.000] They had Chinese, Mongolians invasions where whole provinces were destroyed.

[01:42:34.000 --> 01:42:40.000] Of course, you know, you are not the first people who destroyed villages in Vietnam, unfortunately.

[01:42:41.000 --> 01:42:50.000] And so they are used to that, and it's a great tradition that the village is not lost even when it disappears from the surface of the ground

[01:42:50.000 --> 01:42:59.000] because the village is down below, down below with the tradition, down below with the people, the ancestors who have made the country.

[01:43:00.000 --> 01:43:12.000] Literally, the country is handmade. There is not one square foot, I would say, a square thumb of the earth that has not been built as it is by the peasantry in the past.

[01:43:12.000 --> 01:43:24.000] And this survives. And when it, after 100 years, a village comes back, the descendants of a village come back to the village, they find the village, and the village starts again.

[01:43:59.000 --> 01:44:04.000] Thank you for watching!

## Contact


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